| Chapter 2 Standards for Identifying Abnormal Accounts (Account Numbers) and Notification Procedures |
Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts |
| Article 12 |
The criteria for identifying abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involvement in fraud are as follows:
1. The applicant frequently applies for virtual asset accounts over a short period of time without reasonable explanation.
2. The transaction functions requested by the customer are obviously inconsistent with the customer's age or background.
3. The contact information provided by the customer cannot be verified by using reasonable measures.
4. The virtual asset account has been reported by a virtual asset service provider, financial institution, government agency, or a member of the general public as being used by someone suspected of criminal activity.
5. The virtual asset account has been used with frequent small-amount inward and outward remittances suspected of being probing activities.
6. The customer makes frequent use of the services or facilities of virtual asset service providers within a short period of time in a manner that is obviously at variance with the normal transaction activities of the customer.
7. An inactive virtual asset account with unexpected unusual transactions.
8. A virtual asset account whose holder provides the same mobile phone number as that provided by the customer of another watch-listed virtual asset account in the same virtual asset service provider, and which is suspected to be used for criminal activity.
9. A non-Taiwanese person who is found by a virtual asset service provider to have had relevant identity certification documents, such as resident certificates provided for verification upon the opening of a virtual asset account, revoked prior to expiration, to have overstayed, or to have been reported as missing.
10. A customer who is verified by a virtual asset service provider to have been reported as a missing person.
11. A domestic virtual asset account listed by a judicial police authority as suspected of involvement in fraud.
12. A virtual asset account with transactions that show signs of involvement in fraud, as set out in the Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorism Financing, and Anti-Fraud Crime and Industry Joint Defense Mechanisms and other self-regulatory rules of the Taiwan Virtual Asset Service Provider Association.
13. Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions determined by the competent authority or virtual asset service providers to be suspected of involvement in fraud. |
| Article 13 |
Virtual asset service providers shall implement enhanced customer due diligence to verify the identity of the customer in cases of abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involvement in fraud, and may adopt the following ongoing customer due diligence measures:
1. Obtaining the approval of senior management of the virtual asset service provider before establishing or entering into a new business relationship.
2. Taking reasonable measures to understand the sources of wealth and the source of funds of the customer. The aforementioned source of funds refers to the substantial source from which the funds are generated.
3. Conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. |
| Article 14 |
When virtual asset service providers implement control and management measures provided for in the latter part of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act with respect to abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involvement in fraud, or when it is necessary to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud, they may send inquiries to other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers by telephone, e-mail, the fraud prevention platform, or other means acceptable to the recipient to obtain information about such abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involvement in fraud.
The recipient of the inquiry shall provide the following information as requested by the inquiring institution:
1. Where the recipient of the inquiry is a deposit business institution, it shall provide:
(1) Name of the deposit account holder and account opening date.
(2) The age and occupation of the account holder and the purpose of the account opening or transaction.
(3) Whether there are any abnormal transactions in the deposit account and whether the account is being monitored.
2. Where the recipient of the inquiry is an electronic payment institution, it shall provide:
(1) Name of the electronic payment account holder and account opening date.
(2) The user's age.
(3) Whether there are any abnormal transactions of the electronic payment account and whether the electronic payment account is being monitored.
3. Where the recipient of the inquiry is a card issuer, it shall provide:
(1) Name of the cardholder and card approval date.
(2) The age and occupation of the cardholder.
(3) Whether there are any abnormal transactions on the credit card and whether the card is being monitored.
4. Where the recipient of the inquiry is a virtual asset service provider, it shall provide:
(1) Name of the customer holding the virtual asset account and opening date of the virtual asset account.
(2) The age and occupation of the customer and the purpose of the virtual asset account opening or transaction.
(3) Whether there are any abnormal transactions in the virtual asset account and whether the account is being monitored.
In addition to the information specified in the preceding paragraph, the recipient of the inquiry may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquiring institution to implement the control measures provided for in the latter part of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act or to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud.
The recipient of the inquiry shall provide the requested information within five business days. However, this shall not apply if there are practical operational difficulties, the recipient has explained such difficulties to the inquiring institution within the preceding period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing the requested information.
Where the recipient of the inquiry is a virtual asset service provider, the key points or other procedures for the recipient to confirm the identity of the inquiring institution under this Article shall be formulated by the Taiwan Virtual Asset Service Provider Association and reported to the competent authority for record. |