Article Content
Chapter 2 Standards for Identifying Abnormal Accounts (Account Numbers) and Notification Procedures
Section 1 Deposit Accounts
| Article 3 | The criteria for identifying abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involvement in fraud are as follows:
1. The applicant frequently applies to open a deposit account or to set up designated accounts over a short period of time without reasonable explanation.
2. The transaction functions applied for are obviously inconsistent with the account holder’s age or background.
3. The contact information provided by the account holder cannot be verified by using reasonable measures.
4. The deposit account has been reported by a financial institution or a member of the public as being used by someone suspected of criminal activities.
5. The deposit account has been used with frequent small amount inward/outward remittances suspected of being probing activities.
6. The user makes frequent use of electronic services or facilities of deposit business institutions within a short period of time in a manner that is obviously at variance with the normal transaction activities of the account holder.
7. An inactive deposit account with unexpected unusual transactions.
8. The telephone number provided by the account holder is the same as a telephone number provided by the account holder of another watch-listed deposit account in the same deposit business institution, suspected to be used for criminal activity.
9. The virtual account linked to the deposit account has been listed as a watch-listed virtual account several times within a certain period of time.
10. A deposit account has transactions suspected of involving fraud, as listed in the Model Guidelines for Banks' Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Policies and Procedures.
11. Other deposit accounts or transactions determined by the competent authorities or deposit business institutions that are suspected of being involved in fraud. |
| Article 4 | Deposit business institutions shall implement enhanced due diligence to verify the identity of the account holder in cases of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of fraud, and may adopt the following ongoing due diligence measures:
1. Obtaining the approval of senior management before establishing or entering a new business relationship.
2. Taking reasonable measures to understand the sources of wealth and the source of funds of the account holder. The aforementioned source of funds refers to the substantial source from which the funds generate.
3. Conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. |
| Article 5 | When deposit business institutions implement control and management measures for abnormal deposit accounts suspected of fraud, as described in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act, they may send peer notifications to other deposit business institutions by telephone, e-mail, or other means acceptable to the recipient to obtain information about such abnormal deposit accounts suspected of fraud.
The recipient of the inquiry shall provide the following information as requested by the inquiring institution:
1. Account holder’s name of the deposit account and account opening date.
2. The age and occupation of the account holder and the purpose of the account opening or transaction.
3. Whether there are any abnormal transactions in the deposit account and whether the account is being monitored.
In addition to the peer reference items in the preceding paragraph, the recipient of the notification may also provide other necessary information requested by the entity sending the inquiry to implement the control measures in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act.
The recipient of the notification shall provide the information within five business days. However, this shall not be required if there are practical operational difficulties, which have been explained to the inquiring entity within the preceding period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing the requested information.
The key points or procedures for the confirmation of the inquiring entity by the recipient of the notification under this Article shall be formulated by the Bankers Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for recordation. |
Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts
| Article 6 | The criteria for identifying abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involvement in fraud are as follows:
1. The applicant frequently applies to open an e-payment account over a short period of time without reasonable explanation.
2. The transaction functions applied for are obviously inconsistent with the user's age or background.
3. The contact information provided by the user cannot be verified by using reasonable measures.
4. The e-payment account has been reported by a financial institution or a member of the general public as being used by someone suspected of criminal activity
5. The e-payment account has been used with frequent small amount inward/outward remittances suspected of being probing activities.
6. The user makes frequent use of electronic services or facilities of electronic payment institutions within a short period of time in a manner that is obviously at variance with the normal transaction activities of the user.
7. An inactive account with unexpected unusual transactions.
8. The telephone number provided by the user is the same as a telephone number provided by the user of another watch-listed electronic payment account, suspected of criminal activity.
9. Accounts with transactions that show signs of involvement in fraud, as set out in the Template for Directions Governing Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism of Electronic Payment Institutions.
10. Other e-payment accounts or transactions determined by the competent authority or electronic payment institutions that are suspected of being involved in fraud. |
| Article 7 | Electronic payment institutions shall implement enhanced due diligence to verify the identity of users in cases of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of fraud, and may adopt the following ongoing due diligence measures:
1. Obtaining the approval of senior management before establishing or entering a new business relationship.
2. Taking reasonable measures to understand the source of funds of the user. The aforementioned source of funds refers to the substantial source from which the funds generate.
3. Conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. |
| Article 8 | When electronic payment institutions implement control measures for abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of fraud, as described in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act, they may send peer notifications to other electronic payment institutions by telephone, e-mail, or other means acceptable to the recipient to obtain information about such abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of fraud.
The recipient of the inquiry shall provide the following information as requested by the inquiring institution:
1. Account name of the electronic payment account and account opening date.
2. The user's age.
3. Whether there are any abnormal transactions in the electronic payment account and whether the account is being monitored.
In addition to the peer reference items in the preceding paragraph, the recipient of the notification may also provide other necessary information requested by the entity sending the inquiry to implement the control measures in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act.
The recipient of the notification shall provide the information within five business days. However, this shall not be required if there are practical operational difficulties, which have been explained to the inquiring entity within the preceding period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing the requested information.
The key points or procedures for the confirmation of the inquiring entity by the recipient of the notification under this Article shall be formulated by the Bankers Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for recordation. |
Section 3 Credit Cards
| Article 9 | The criteria for identifying abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of involvement in-fraud are as follows:
1. The applicant frequently applies for credit cards over a short period of time without reasonable explanation.
2. The credit card has been reported by a financial institution or a member of the general public as being used by someone suspected of criminal activity.
3. The credit card has been used with frequent small transactions suspected of being probing activities.
4. The user makes frequent use of credit card transactions within a short period of time in a manner that is obviously at variance with the normal transaction activities of the cardholder.
5. An inactive credit card with unexpected unusual transactions.
6. The telephone number provided by the cardholder is the same as a telephone number provided by a cardholder of another watch-listed credit card settlement number in the same issuer , suspected of criminal activity.
7. A credit card with transactions that show signs of involvement in fraud, as set out in the Template for Directions Governing Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing for Credit Card Business Institutions.
8. Other credit cards or transactions determined by the competent authority or issuers that are suspected of being involved in fraud. |
| Article 10 | Card issuers shall implement enhanced due diligence to verify the identity of the cardholder in cases of abnormal credit cards suspected of fraud, and may adopt the following ongoing due diligence measures:
1. Obtaining the approval of senior management before establishing or entering a new business relationship.
2. Taking reasonable measures to understand the sources of wealth and the source of funds of the cardholder. The aforementioned source of funds refers to the substantial source from which the funds generate.
3. Conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. |
| Article 11 | When card issuers implement control and management measures for abnormal credit cards suspected of fraud, as described in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act,they may send peer notifications other credit card business institutions by telephone, e-mail, or other means acceptable to the recipient to obtain information about such abnormal credit cards suspected of fraud.
The recipient of the inquiry shall provide the following information as requested by the inquiring institution:
1. Name of the cardholder and card activation date.
2. The age and occupation of the cardholder.
3. Whether there are any abnormal transactions on the credit card and whether the card is being monitored.
In addition to the peer reference items in the preceding paragraph, the recipient of the notification may also provide other necessary information requested by the entity sending the inquiry to implement the control measures in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act.
The recipient of the notification shall provide the information within five business days. However, this shall not be required if there are practical operational difficulties, which have been explained to the inquiring entity within the preceding period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing the requested information.
The key points or procedures for the confirmation of the inquiring entity by the recipient of the notification under this Article shall be formulated by the Bankers Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for recordation. |
Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
| Article 12 | The criteria for identifying abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involvement in-fraud are as follows:
1. The applicant frequently applies for virtual asset accounts over a short period of time without reasonable explanation.
2. The transaction functions requested by the customer are obviously inconsistent with the customer's age or background.
3. The contact information provided by the customer cannot be verified by using reasonable measures.
4. The virtual asset account has been reported by a virtual asset service provider or a member of the general public as being used by someone suspected of criminal activity.
5. The virtual asset account has been used with frequent small amount inward/outward remittances suspected of being probing activities.
6. The customer makes frequent use of the services or facilities of virtual asset service providers within a short period of time in a manner that is obviously at variance with the normal transaction activities of the customer.
7. An inactive virtual asset account with unexpected unusual transactions.
8. A virtual asset account with transactions that show signs of involvement in fraud, as set out in the Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorism Financing, and Anti-Fraud Crime and Industry Joint Defense Mechanisms and other self-regulatory rules of the Taiwan Virtual Asset Service Provider Association.
9. Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions deemed suspicious by the competent authority or virtual asset service providers that aresuspected of being involved in fraud. |
| Article 13 | Virtual asset service providers shall implement enhanced customer due diligence to verify the identity of the customer in cases of abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of fraud, and may adopt the following ongoing customer due diligence measures:
1. Obtaining the approval of senior management of the virtual asset service provider before establishing or entering a new business relationship.
2. Taking reasonable measures to understand the sources of wealth and the source of funds of the customer; The aforementioned source of funds refers to the substantial source from which the funds generate.
3. Conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. |
| Article 14 | When virtual asset service providers implement control measures for abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of fraud, as described in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act, they may send peer notifications to other virtual asset service providers by telephone, e-mail, or other means acceptable to the recipient to obtain information about such abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of fraud.
The recipient of the inquiry shall provide the following information as requested by the inquiring institution:
1. Name of the customer of the virtual asset account and opening date of the virtual asset account.
2. The age and occupation of the customer and the purpose of the virtual asset account opening or transaction.
3. Whether there are any abnormal transactions in the virtual asset account and whether the account is being monitored.
In addition to the peer reference items in the preceding paragraph, the recipient of the notification may also provide other necessary information requested by the entity sending the inquiry to implement the control measures in the second half of Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Act.
The recipient of the notification shall provide the information within five business days. However, this shall not be required if there are practical operational difficulties, which have been explained to the inquiring entity within the preceding period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing the requested information.
The key points or procedures for the confirmation of the inquiring entity by the recipient of the notification under this Article shall be formulated by the Taiwan Virtual Asset Service Provider Association and reported to the competent authority for recordation. |